Suchergebnisse

Chapter 1: Introduction -- Chapter 2: The Psychology of Foreign Policy -- Chapter 3: Historical Memories in China's Perceptions of Japan -- Chapter 4: Public Opinion and China's Japan Policy -- Chapter 5: Politics of Memories: The Yasukuni Shrine Issue -- Chapter 6: Conclusion.

India's north-easternmost state of Arunachal Pradesh has a border with Tibet and is one of the most extensive territories claimed by the People's Republic of China (PRC). The watchword here is the "McMahon Line," as Beijing disagrees with New Delhi's position on acknowledging it as the boundary between China and India. China rejects the McMahon Line, which it calls "illegal" and "unacceptable," for the following reasons: first, the Sino-Indian boundary has never been adequately demarcated; no treaty or agreement has been made between the Chinese Central Government and the government of India. Second, Beijing rejected the McMahon Line under the pretext of "imperialist legacy" and disregarded the 1914 Simla Convention between Britain, China, and Tibet because Tibet was not a sovereign state and, therefore, had no power to conclude treaties. Thus, India and China are stuck in the quagmire of an unresolved boundary dispute due to the absence of an internationally accepted boundary between the two countries, the lack of an agreement over the de facto 'Line of Actual Control,' and the border not being demarcated on the ground or delineated on maps. The outcome of being India-China boundary dispute is divided into three sectors: the western sector, the middle sector, and the eastern sector, of which Arunachal Pradesh is a part.

In October, at the 25th meeting of the Working Mechanism for Consultation & Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (WMCC), both parties examined the Line of Actual Control (LAC) situation and appreciated the latest disengagement at Patrolling Point 15 in Gogra-Hot Springs as well as agreed to hold the 17th round of Commander-level talks to resolve the remaining issues at the LAC. Since April 2020, the military standoff along the LAC in Eastern Ladakh has disrupted India-China relations. While disengagement has been completed but to construe that the disengagement will lead to de-escalation is misleading. The fact remains that the border dispute has only become complicated. Thus, the border and the India-China ties have a 'new normal' - that is, 'not normal'.

The 20th Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) [中国共产党第二十次全国代表大], held October 16-22, was the most anticipated event in China and abroad. With the goal of reorganizing the country's leadership and defining its political and policy objectives, the Party Congress solidified Xi Jinping's third term and, more importantly, his supreme control in China by promoting his allies and cadres and getting rid of the factions.

On March 25, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi made a surprise visit to India after stopovers in Pakistan and Afghanistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China [FMPRC], March 25). The visit was the first by a high-level Chinese official to India since December 2019, and the ongoing border standoff that broke out in May 2020 along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh. The sudden stopover, which was not announced in advance, generated speculation over Beijing's intentions, mainly as it occurred in the immediate aftermath of Russia initiating its "special military operation" against Ukraine on February 24. This resulted in international condemnation and boycotts and the imposition of economic sanctions by the U.S., the European Union, Japan, and others on Russia. However, countries such as China and India made an exception by choosing neutrality in condemning Russia. But did this shared position make any difference in improving China-India ties? Hitherto, relations have not substantively improved, notwithstanding the modest progress in the recent border talks. Following the 16th round of Corps Commander-level talks on July 17, China and India stressed the "four-point consensus" they had reached on the resolution of the border issues (Xinhuanet, July 29). This "consensus" was further cited as the reason for the disengagement of troops from Patrolling Point-15 in Gogra-Hot Springs (Global Times, September 9). Notably, the disengagement followed a year-long impasse in the talks process and coincided with both countries' participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit.

Taking the Eastern Ladakh crisis as the backdrop, Kanti Bajpai, a renowned scholar of international affairs with a special interest in India-China relations, in his book India Versus China: Why They Are Not Friends contextualises the antagonism in the India-China ties by drawing from the past and assessing the implications of it in the present and future. As Bajpai emphatically posits: "Why did these two societies become locked into a conflict that has stubbornly refused to go away?" (p. 1). To which, Bajpai suggests the need for a deeper introspection as proved by the Ladakh crisis, the relations between the two countries "are darker and more complex than most observers appreciate or acknowledge" (ibid.). To be specific, as Bajpai asks in the very title: Why India and China are not Friends?